Overcoming initial military challenges by Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka: July – September 1987

As soon as the IPKF was withdrawn prematurely, India was bereft of any decisive affect to supervise the implementation of the political provisions of the Accord by Sri Lanka. (File picture: IE)

By Colonel RS Sidhu

Backdrop to Army Operations by IPKF

IPKF army operations can’t be checked out in isolation from the Indo Sri Lanka Accord of 29 July 1987, which is inherently flawed from India’s standpoint. Severe practitioners of geopolitics will at all times surprise as to how India, which vigorously pushed its strategy to get the Accord signed and applied, didn’t safeguard its personal geopolitical pursuits.

Sri Lanka was capable of safe the acceptance by all events that its unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity shall stay inviolate. Inside the constraints of its personal pursuits, India did negotiate the absolute best deal for Sri Lanka Tamils inside the framework of the Structure of Sri Lanka.

Nevertheless India didn’t safe its personal pursuits. By committing to the Indian army intervention being incumbent on request of the Authorities of Sri Lanka, it ended up dealing the important thing ace to the latter. As soon as the IPKF was withdrawn prematurely, India was bereft of any decisive affect to supervise the implementation of the political provisions of the Accord by Sri Lanka.

There’s additionally no denying the truth that Sri Lanka and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the primary Tamil insurgent group, have been by no means eager on the Accord. India’s pushing it by means of regardless of resistance from the 2 most important protagonists, resulted within the edifice of the Accord being erected on weak foundations. But it by no means crossed the minds of our overseas coverage and safety institutions to cater for the contingency of 1 or each the protagonists reneging from the commitments of the Accord.

Army Challenges Posed By the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord

India’s intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 adopted an escalation curve from making an attempt a political resolution, to forceful makes an attempt at offering humanitarian help, and culminating in a traditional army intervention. The Accord was beneath negotiation between the 2 international locations for a protracted period, as might be discerned from para 2.15 which states “…the proposals are conditional to an acceptance of the proposals negotiated from 4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986.” Unarmed flotilla of Indian boats carrying humanitarian help to struggling Tamil inhabitants of Jaffna was turned again by Sri Lanka Navy, resulting in launch of Operation Poomalai mission undertaken by the Indian Air Drive for airdropping provides over the besieged city of Jaffna in Sri Lanka on 4 June 1987.

The upcoming launch of offensive operations from 4 mounting bases viz. Agra, Secunderabad, Visakhapatnam and Chennai was by itself a serious army problem. The undue haste in signing and executing the Accord, in a single day modified the complete complexion of operations from an offensive to a peacekeeping function with no time for detailed planning, preparations, coordination, liaison and briefings. The collaborating models and troops have been immediately unsure concerning the modified function:-

– The phrases of the accord and the army’s function in its implementation.

– Angle of the Sri Lanka Military (SLA) and its armed paramilitary and police organisations.

– Ambivalence in conditions necessitating use of armed drive apart from in self-defense.

– Restricted logistics again up.

Previous to induction for operations in Sri Lanka, the collaborating formations and models have been orbatted with strike formation the place coaching is organized for standard offensive operations as per formation coaching directive. Counter-insurgency or peacekeeping operations weren’t the assigned operational activity. But inside three months of deployment the troops have been launched to conduct counter-insurgency operations necessitated by the sudden change of nationwide intention.

The Interregnum Interval of August and September

The very day of the accord, formations and models of 54 Infantry Division commenced induction into the Northern and Jap Provinces. The Division Headquarters together with 91 Infantry Brigade have been inducted into Jaffna peninsula by air transport to Palaly airfield, whereas 47 Infantry Brigade carried out amphibious landings at Kankesanthurai jetty.

fifteenth Mechanised Infantry Battalion much less two firms was air transported to Palaly airfield, and a second Mechanised Infantry Firm performed amphibious landings at Kankesanthurai jetty, along side 91 Infantry Brigade.

76 Infantry Brigade together with the third Mechanised Infantry Firm was moved by Touchdown Ship Tanks (LSTs) and service provider delivery to Trincomalee harbour and deployed alongside the entire stretch of the Jap Province from Trincomalee to Batticaloa and additional South to Akkaraipattu, Amparai and Pottuvil.

The deployment was designated as a peacekeeping operation, out of the country having a longtime governance organisation, an efficient safety infrastructure and but rife with ethnic, linguistic and communal fervor. There have been no set opponents, precedents and guidelines to go by. An uneasy equation prevailed between the IPKF and the Sri Lankan safety forces, because the army hierarchy of the 2 armies interacted on the modus operandi of implementing the peace protecting operations in IPKF mandated areas of Northern and Jap Provinces of Sri Lanka.

Throughout this interregnum the preventing troops have been strictly confined to camps aside from logistics motion. This unfairly denied terrain familiarisation to the fight troops, essential for conduct of army operations. Coupled with a complete void in army terrain maps of the world it could severely impede the conduct of preliminary phases of subsequent army operations.

The primary severe risk which might have led to a possible unraveling of the accord occurred with the outbreak of ethno-religious riots in September 1987 in Trincomalee city. IPKF fight presence in Trincomalee was insufficient to comprise the riots. The Deputy Common Officer Commanding of the 54 Infantry Division and the Battalion Headquarters of fifteenth Mechanised Infantry Battalion have been moved submit haste to Trincomalee to determine an ad-hoc Sector Headquarter and management the ethnic strife. Utilizing these riots as cowl Sri Lanka tried to push by means of extra troops from Colombo to Trincomalee. Having been forewarned, a Mechanised Infantry Activity Drive established a swift roadblock to intercept the SLA reinforcements from getting into Jap Province. The scenario was dealt with with finesse and a clumsy risk to the accord was negated.

The end result of the incident had a optimistic impression of showcasing the resolve of IPKF to brook no interference in areas beneath its mandate. This to an awesome extent deterred the SLA from adopting an adventurous course in Northern and Jap Provinces.

By finish September it was clear that the LTTE and the opposite Tamil militant teams have been taking part in truant in surrendering their full cache of weapons and army tools.

Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement

17 LTTE cadres, together with Pulendran (Lt Col) and Kumarappa (Lt Col), commanders of Batticaloa and Trincomalee areas respectively, have been apprehended by the Sri Lankan Navy on evening 2nd / third October 1987 within the Palk Strait off Jaffna shoreline whereas clandestinely transporting by boats a big consignment of weapons and ammunition. They have been delivered to Palaly airfield, the primary base of SLA in Jaffna Peninsula, pending switch to Colombo for additional motion.

The LTTE insisted that every one its cadres have been protected against arrest beneath the supply of normal amnesty granted beneath para 2.11 of the Accord and approached 54 Infantry Division to get their cadres launched from SLA custody. The SLA was equally adamant that carrying of weapons was a breach of the supply of give up of all weapons and ammunition by the militant teams beneath para 2.9 of the Accord, and that the militants have been arrested as frequent criminals exterior the jurisdiction of IPKF.

54 Infantry Division referred the matter to greater Indian authorities, who in flip directed them to stop the switch of prisoners to Colombo until a remaining determination was arrived at.

Agency intervention of the Indian military ensured periodic entry by Indian Military docs to the LTTE prisoners to observe their well being. SLA was additionally persuaded by Indian Military to allow an LTTE delegation led by their army commander Mahathya to satisfy with the prisoners.

Nevertheless, the scenario tensed additional on 4th October 1987, within the afternoon, when a Sri Lankan Air Drive airplane landed on the Palaly airfield to ferry the prisoners to Colombo the following day.

The LTTE set the deadline of afternoon of fifth October 1987 for launch of their cadres. Realising that their switch was now imminent, the 17 prisoners consumed cyanide in early night the identical day. 5 prisoners have been saved by means of resuscitation makes an attempt by Indian Military. The opposite 12, together with Pulendran and Kumarappa, died.

Stance of LTTE

The Accord promised larger autonomy and merger of Tamil majority North and East Provinces, inside a broad democratic framework beneath the Sri Lanka structure. But it fell far wanting LTTE’s political aspirations of an unbiased Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka. Sharing of political area in a democratic system of governance was an anathema to its political ideology. It checked out itself as the only real professional consultant of the Sri Lanka Tamils and brooked no rivals. This dogma propelled them to launch violent fratricidal wars to the end, towards different Tamil insurgent organisations, and is validation of this reflection.

This incident was merely used as an excuse to tug out from the Accord by LTTE chief V Prabhakaran, as is clear from its reluctance to give up its weapons and ammunition effectively past the three days deadline, and likewise in persevering with to additional construct up its fight potential.

The Aftermath

The LTTE repudiated the Accord and likewise confirmed its defiance by launching shock assaults on remoted IPKF picquets. That the IPKF was ill-prepared for this eventuality is highlighted by the hasty induction of extra formations to grab management of the Jaffna peninsula from the grip of LTTE.

(The creator is a veteran from the Military’s Mechanised Infantry Regiment who served all through the complete period of Operation PAWAN from 1987 to 1990. Aside from his hands-on expertise of coping with LTTE in energetic anti-terrorist operations in Jaffna, he’s additionally the creator of two books, ‘Success from Being Mad’ on entrepreneurship ventures by veterans, and ‘Elephant on the Excessive Himalayas’ on India China discourse. He may also be accessed at his BlogSpot valleysandvalour.blogspot.com. Views expressed are private and don’t replicate the official place or coverage of Monetary Specific On-line.)